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-rw-r--r--tests/reverse/config_symlink_test.go101
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tests/reverse/config_symlink_test.go b/tests/reverse/config_symlink_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..beb9d0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/reverse/config_symlink_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+package reverse_test
+
+import (
+ "os"
+ "os/exec"
+ "strings"
+ "syscall"
+ "testing"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/v2/tests/test_helpers"
+)
+
+// TestConfigSymlink verifies that gocryptfs.conf in the reverse view does
+// not follow a symlink at .gocryptfs.reverse.conf. The config file is passed
+// through unencrypted, so following the symlink would let anybody with write
+// access to the backing directory read arbitrary files (like /etc/shadow when
+// gocryptfs runs as root) through the mount.
+func TestConfigSymlink(t *testing.T) {
+ backingDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(test_helpers.TmpDir, t.Name()+".")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ cmd := exec.Command(test_helpers.GocryptfsBinary, "-q", "-init", "-reverse",
+ "-extpass", "echo test", "-scryptn=10", backingDir)
+ cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = os.Stdout, os.Stderr
+ if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("init failed: %v", err)
+ }
+ mnt := backingDir + ".mnt"
+ // -wpanic=false because gocryptfs warns about the symlink and the FIFO
+ test_helpers.MountOrFatal(t, backingDir, mnt, "-reverse", "-extpass", "echo test", "-wpanic=false")
+ defer test_helpers.UnmountPanic(mnt)
+
+ conf := backingDir + "/.gocryptfs.reverse.conf"
+ mntConf := mnt + "/gocryptfs.conf"
+ // Sanity check: the regular config file is visible
+ if _, err := os.Stat(mntConf); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ // Replace .gocryptfs.reverse.conf with a symlink to a secret file
+ const secretContent = "SECRET-dd0eea2a"
+ secret := backingDir + ".secret"
+ if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte(secretContent), 0600); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ if err := os.Rename(conf, conf+".bak"); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ if err := os.Symlink(secret, conf); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ data, err := os.ReadFile(mntConf)
+ if strings.Contains(string(data), secretContent) {
+ t.Fatalf("symlink was followed, secret leaked: %q", data)
+ }
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Errorf("reading %s should have failed", mntConf)
+ }
+
+ // Replace it with a FIFO. Opening it must neither hang nor succeed.
+ if err := os.Remove(conf); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ if err := syscall.Mkfifo(conf, 0600); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ done := make(chan error, 1)
+ go func() {
+ _, err := os.ReadFile(mntConf)
+ done <- err
+ }()
+ select {
+ case err := <-done:
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Errorf("reading %s (FIFO) should have failed", mntConf)
+ }
+ case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+ // Unblock the hung open so that unmount can succeed
+ if f, err := os.OpenFile(conf, os.O_WRONLY|syscall.O_NONBLOCK, 0); err == nil {
+ f.Close()
+ }
+ t.Fatalf("reading %s (FIFO) hung", mntConf)
+ }
+
+ // Restore the regular file. It must be visible again.
+ if err := os.Remove(conf); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ if err := os.Rename(conf+".bak", conf); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ data, err = os.ReadFile(mntConf)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ if len(data) == 0 {
+ t.Error("empty config file")
+ }
+}