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|
// +build !without_openssl
package stupidgcm
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"fmt"
"log"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
)
/*
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#cgo pkg-config: libcrypto
int chacha20poly1305_seal(const unsigned char * const plaintext, const int plaintextLen,
const unsigned char * const authData, const int authDataLen,
const unsigned char * const key, const int keyLen,
const unsigned char * const iv, const int ivLen,
unsigned char * const ciphertext, const int ciphertextBufLen);
*/
import "C"
type stupidChacha20poly1305 struct {
key [chacha20poly1305.KeySize]byte
wiped bool
}
// Verify that we satisfy the cipher.AEAD interface
var _ cipher.AEAD = &stupidChacha20poly1305{}
func newChacha20poly1305(key []byte) cipher.AEAD {
if len(key) != chacha20poly1305.KeySize {
log.Panicf("Only %d-byte keys are supported, you passed %d bytes", chacha20poly1305.KeySize, len(key))
}
ret := new(stupidChacha20poly1305)
copy(ret.key[:], key)
return ret
}
// NonceSize returns the required size of the nonce / IV.
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int {
return chacha20poly1305.NonceSize
}
// Overhead returns the number of bytes that are added for authentication.
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Overhead() int {
return tagLen
}
// Seal encrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte {
if g.wiped {
panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
}
if len(iv) != g.NonceSize() {
log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported, you passed %d bytes", g.NonceSize(), len(iv))
}
if len(in) == 0 {
log.Panic("Zero-length input data is not supported")
}
if len(g.key) != chacha20poly1305.KeySize {
log.Panicf("Wrong key length: %d. Key has been wiped?", len(g.key))
}
// If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer
outLen := len(in) + tagLen
var buf []byte
inplace := false
if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen {
inplace = true
buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen]
} else {
buf = make([]byte, outLen)
}
C.chacha20poly1305_seal((*C.uchar)(&in[0]),
C.int(len(in)),
(*C.uchar)(&authData[0]),
C.int(len(authData)),
(*C.uchar)(&g.key[0]),
C.int(len(g.key)),
(*C.uchar)(&iv[0]),
C.int(len(iv)),
(*C.uchar)(&buf[0]),
C.int(len(buf)))
if inplace {
return dst[:len(dst)+outLen]
}
return append(dst, buf...)
}
// Open decrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst"
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Open(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if g.wiped {
panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key")
}
if len(iv) != g.NonceSize() {
log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported", g.NonceSize())
}
if len(g.key) != chacha20poly1305.KeySize {
log.Panicf("Wrong key length: %d. Key has been wiped?", len(g.key))
}
if len(in) <= tagLen {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stupidChacha20poly1305: input data too short (%d bytes)", len(in))
}
// If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer
outLen := len(in) - tagLen
var buf []byte
inplace := false
if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen {
inplace = true
buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen]
} else {
buf = make([]byte, len(in)-tagLen)
}
ciphertext := in[:len(in)-tagLen]
tag := in[len(in)-tagLen:]
// https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Authenticated_Encryption_and_Decryption#Authenticated_Encryption_using_GCM_mode
// Create scratch space "context"
ctx := C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()
if ctx == nil {
log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed")
}
// Set cipher to AES-256
if C.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, C.EVP_chacha20_poly1305(), nil, nil, nil) != 1 {
log.Panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex I failed")
}
// Set key and IV
if C.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, nil, nil, (*C.uchar)(&g.key[0]), (*C.uchar)(&iv[0])) != 1 {
log.Panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex II failed")
}
// Set expected MAC tag
if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tagLen, (unsafe.Pointer)(&tag[0])) != 1 {
log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG failed")
}
// Provide authentication data
var resultLen C.int
if C.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, nil, &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&authData[0]), C.int(len(authData))) != 1 {
log.Panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate authData failed")
}
if int(resultLen) != len(authData) {
log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
}
// Decrypt "ciphertext" into "buf"
if C.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&buf[0]), &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&ciphertext[0]), C.int(len(ciphertext))) != 1 {
log.Panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate failed")
}
if int(resultLen) != len(ciphertext) {
log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
}
// Check MAC
dummy := make([]byte, 16)
res := C.EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&dummy[0]), &resultLen)
if resultLen != 0 {
log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen)
}
// Free scratch space
C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx)
if res != 1 {
return nil, ErrAuth
}
if inplace {
return dst[:len(dst)+outLen], nil
}
return append(dst, buf...), nil
}
// Wipe tries to wipe the key from memory by overwriting it with zeros.
//
// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but
// still raises the bar for extracting the key.
func (g *stupidChacha20poly1305) Wipe() {
g.wiped = true
for i := range g.key {
g.key[i] = 0
}
}
|
