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path: root/internal/fusefrontend/root_node.go
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package fusefrontend

import (
	"os"
	"sync/atomic"
	"syscall"
	"time"

	"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/configfile"
	"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/contentenc"
	"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/inomap"
	"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/nametransform"
	"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat"
	"github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/tlog"
)

// RootNode is the root of the filesystem tree of Nodes.
type RootNode struct {
	Node
	// args stores configuration arguments
	args Args
	// Filename encryption helper
	nameTransform nametransform.NameTransformer
	// Content encryption helper
	contentEnc *contentenc.ContentEnc
	// MitigatedCorruptions is used to report data corruption that is internally
	// mitigated by ignoring the corrupt item. For example, when OpenDir() finds
	// a corrupt filename, we still return the other valid filenames.
	// The corruption is logged to syslog to inform the user,	and in addition,
	// the corrupt filename is logged to this channel via
	// reportMitigatedCorruption().
	// "gocryptfs -fsck" reads from the channel to also catch these transparently-
	// mitigated corruptions.
	MitigatedCorruptions chan string
	// IsIdle flag is set to zero each time fs.isFiltered() is called
	// (uint32 so that it can be reset with CompareAndSwapUint32).
	// When -idle was used when mounting, idleMonitor() sets it to 1
	// periodically.
	IsIdle uint32
	// inoMap translates inode numbers from different devices to unique inode
	// numbers.
	inoMap *inomap.InoMap
}

func NewRootNode(args Args, c *contentenc.ContentEnc, n nametransform.NameTransformer) *RootNode {
	// TODO
	return &RootNode{
		args:          args,
		nameTransform: n,
		contentEnc:    c,
		inoMap:        inomap.New(),
	}
}

// mangleOpenFlags is used by Create() and Open() to convert the open flags the user
// wants to the flags we internally use to open the backing file.
// The returned flags always contain O_NOFOLLOW.
func (rn *RootNode) mangleOpenFlags(flags uint32) (newFlags int) {
	newFlags = int(flags)
	// Convert WRONLY to RDWR. We always need read access to do read-modify-write cycles.
	if (newFlags & syscall.O_ACCMODE) == syscall.O_WRONLY {
		newFlags = newFlags ^ os.O_WRONLY | os.O_RDWR
	}
	// We also cannot open the file in append mode, we need to seek back for RMW
	newFlags = newFlags &^ os.O_APPEND
	// O_DIRECT accesses must be aligned in both offset and length. Due to our
	// crypto header, alignment will be off, even if userspace makes aligned
	// accesses. Running xfstests generic/013 on ext4 used to trigger lots of
	// EINVAL errors due to missing alignment. Just fall back to buffered IO.
	newFlags = newFlags &^ syscallcompat.O_DIRECT
	// Create and Open are two separate FUSE operations, so O_CREAT should not
	// be part of the open flags.
	newFlags = newFlags &^ syscall.O_CREAT
	// We always want O_NOFOLLOW to be safe against symlink races
	newFlags |= syscall.O_NOFOLLOW
	return newFlags
}

// reportMitigatedCorruption is used to report a corruption that was transparently
// mitigated and did not return an error to the user. Pass the name of the corrupt
// item (filename for OpenDir(), xattr name for ListXAttr() etc).
// See the MitigatedCorruptions channel for more info.
func (rn *RootNode) reportMitigatedCorruption(item string) {
	if rn.MitigatedCorruptions == nil {
		return
	}
	select {
	case rn.MitigatedCorruptions <- item:
	case <-time.After(1 * time.Second):
		tlog.Warn.Printf("BUG: reportCorruptItem: timeout")
		//debug.PrintStack()
		return
	}
}

// isFiltered - check if plaintext "path" should be forbidden
//
// Prevents name clashes with internal files when file names are not encrypted
func (rn *RootNode) isFiltered(path string) bool {
	atomic.StoreUint32(&rn.IsIdle, 0)

	if !rn.args.PlaintextNames {
		return false
	}
	// gocryptfs.conf in the root directory is forbidden
	if path == configfile.ConfDefaultName {
		tlog.Info.Printf("The name /%s is reserved when -plaintextnames is used\n",
			configfile.ConfDefaultName)
		return true
	}
	// Note: gocryptfs.diriv is NOT forbidden because diriv and plaintextnames
	// are exclusive
	return false
}