package reverse_test import ( "bytes" "fmt" "io/ioutil" "os" "runtime" "syscall" "testing" "golang.org/x/sys/unix" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/ctlsock" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat" "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/tests/test_helpers" ) // TestLongnameStat checks that file names of all sizes (1 to 255) show up in // the decrypted reverse view (dirC, mounted in TestMain). func TestLongnameStat(t *testing.T) { for i := 1; i <= 255; i++ { name := string(bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), i)) fd, err := os.Create(dirA + "/" + name) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } fd.Close() path := dirC + "/" + name if !test_helpers.VerifyExistence(path) { t.Fatalf("failed to verify %q", path) } test_helpers.VerifySize(t, path, 0) // A large number of longname files is a performance problem in // reverse mode. Move the file out of the way once we are done with it // to speed up the test (2 seconds -> 0.2 seconds). // We do NOT unlink it because ext4 reuses inode numbers immediately, // which will cause "Found linked inode, but Nlink == 1" warnings and // file not found errors. // TODO: This problem should be handled at the go-fuse level. syscall.Rename(dirA+"/"+name, test_helpers.TmpDir+"/"+fmt.Sprintf("x%d", i)) } } func TestSymlinks(t *testing.T) { target := "/" os.Symlink(target, dirA+"/symlink") cSymlink := dirC + "/symlink" _, err := os.Lstat(cSymlink) if err != nil { t.Errorf("Lstat: %v", err) } _, err = os.Stat(cSymlink) if err != nil { t.Errorf("Stat: %v", err) } actualTarget, err := os.Readlink(cSymlink) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } if target != actualTarget { t.Errorf("wrong symlink target: want=%q have=%q", target, actualTarget) } } // Symbolic link dentry sizes should be set to the length of the string // that contains the target path. func TestSymlinkDentrySize(t *testing.T) { if plaintextnames { t.Skip("this only tests encrypted names") } symlink := "a_symlink" mnt, err := ioutil.TempDir(test_helpers.TmpDir, "reverse_mnt_") if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } sock := mnt + ".sock" test_helpers.MountOrFatal(t, "ctlsock_reverse_test_fs", mnt, "-reverse", "-extpass", "echo test", "-ctlsock="+sock) defer test_helpers.UnmountPanic(mnt) req := ctlsock.RequestStruct{EncryptPath: symlink} symlinkResponse := test_helpers.QueryCtlSock(t, sock, req) if symlinkResponse.ErrNo != 0 { t.Errorf("Encrypt: %q ErrNo=%d ErrText=%s", symlink, symlinkResponse.ErrNo, symlinkResponse.ErrText) } fi, err := os.Lstat(mnt + "/" + symlinkResponse.Result) if err != nil { t.Errorf("Lstat: %v", err) } target, err := os.Readlink(mnt + "/" + symlinkResponse.Result) if err != nil { t.Errorf("Readlink: %v", err) } if fi.Size() != int64(len(target)) { t.Errorf("Lstat reports that symbolic link %q's dentry size is %d, but this does not "+ "match the length of the string returned by readlink, which is %d.", symlink, fi.Size(), len(target)) } } // .gocryptfs.reverse.conf in the plaintext dir should be visible as // gocryptfs.conf func TestConfigMapping(t *testing.T) { c := dirB + "/gocryptfs.conf" if !test_helpers.VerifyExistence(c) { t.Errorf("%s missing", c) } data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(c) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } if len(data) == 0 { t.Errorf("empty file") } } // Check that the access() syscall works on virtual files func TestAccessVirtual(t *testing.T) { if plaintextnames { t.Skip("test makes no sense for plaintextnames") } var R_OK uint32 = 4 var W_OK uint32 = 2 var X_OK uint32 = 1 fn := dirB + "/gocryptfs.diriv" err := syscall.Access(fn, R_OK) if err != nil { t.Errorf("%q should be readable, but got error: %v", fn, err) } err = syscall.Access(fn, W_OK) if err == nil { t.Errorf("should NOT be writeable") } err = syscall.Access(fn, X_OK) if err == nil { t.Errorf("should NOT be executable") } } // Check that the access() syscall works on regular files func TestAccess(t *testing.T) { f, err := os.Create(dirA + "/testaccess1") if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } f.Close() f, err = os.Open(dirB) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } defer f.Close() names, err := f.Readdirnames(0) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } for _, n := range names { // Check if file exists - this should never fail err = syscallcompat.Faccessat(unix.AT_FDCWD, dirB+"/"+n, unix.F_OK) if err != nil { t.Errorf("%s: %v", n, err) } // Check if file is readable err = syscallcompat.Faccessat(unix.AT_FDCWD, dirB+"/"+n, unix.R_OK) if err != nil { t.Logf("%s: %v", n, err) } } } // Opening a nonexistant file name should return ENOENT // and not EBADMSG or EIO or anything else. func TestEnoent(t *testing.T) { fn := dirB + "/TestEnoent" _, err := syscall.Open(fn, syscall.O_RDONLY, 0) if err != syscall.ENOENT { t.Errorf("want ENOENT, got: %v", err) } } // If the symlink target gets too long due to base64 encoding, we should // return ENAMETOOLONG instead of having the kernel reject the data and // returning an I/O error to the user. // https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/167 func TestTooLongSymlink(t *testing.T) { l := 4000 if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" { l = 1000 // max length is much lower on darwin } fn := dirA + "/TooLongSymlink" target := string(bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), l)) err := os.Symlink(target, fn) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } _, err = os.Readlink(dirC + "/TooLongSymlink") if err == nil { return } err2 := err.(*os.PathError) if err2.Err != syscall.ENAMETOOLONG { t.Errorf("Expected %q error, got %q instead", syscall.ENAMETOOLONG, err2.Err) } } // Test that we can traverse a directory with 0100 permissions // (execute but no read). This used to be a problem as OpenDirNofollow opened // all directory in the path with O_RDONLY. Now it uses O_PATH, which only needs // the executable bit. func Test0100Dir(t *testing.T) { dir := dirA + "/" + t.Name() err := os.Mkdir(dir, 0700) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } file := dir + "/hello" err = ioutil.WriteFile(file, []byte("hello"), 0600) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } err = os.Chmod(dir, 0100) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } fileReverse := dirC + "/" + t.Name() + "/hello" fd, err := os.Open(fileReverse) // Make sure the dir can be removed after the test is done os.Chmod(dir, 0700) if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } fd.Close() }