From e2ec048a09889b2bf71e8bbfef9f0584ff7d69db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakob Unterwurzacher Date: Sat, 4 Sep 2021 11:41:56 +0200 Subject: stupidgcm: introduce stupidAEADCommon and use for both chacha & gcm Nice deduplication and brings the GCM decrypt speed up to par. internal/speed$ benchstat old new name old time/op new time/op delta StupidGCM-4 4.71µs ± 0% 4.66µs ± 0% -0.99% (p=0.008 n=5+5) StupidGCMDecrypt-4 5.77µs ± 1% 4.51µs ± 0% -21.80% (p=0.008 n=5+5) name old speed new speed delta StupidGCM-4 870MB/s ± 0% 879MB/s ± 0% +1.01% (p=0.008 n=5+5) StupidGCMDecrypt-4 710MB/s ± 1% 908MB/s ± 0% +27.87% (p=0.008 n=5+5) --- internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go | 204 ---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 204 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go (limited to 'internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go') diff --git a/internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go b/internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go deleted file mode 100644 index 46b6b86..0000000 --- a/internal/stupidgcm/stupidgcm.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -// +build !without_openssl - -// Package stupidgcm is a thin wrapper for OpenSSL's GCM encryption and -// decryption functions. It only support 32-byte keys and 16-bit IVs. -package stupidgcm - -// #include -// #include "chacha.h" -// #cgo pkg-config: libcrypto -import "C" - -import ( - "crypto/cipher" - "fmt" - "log" - "unsafe" -) - -const ( - // BuiltWithoutOpenssl indicates if openssl been disabled at compile-time - BuiltWithoutOpenssl = false - - keyLen = 32 - ivLen = 16 - tagLen = 16 -) - -// StupidGCM implements the cipher.AEAD interface -type StupidGCM struct { - key []byte - forceDecode bool -} - -// Verify that we satisfy the cipher.AEAD interface -var _ cipher.AEAD = &StupidGCM{} - -// New returns a new cipher.AEAD implementation.. -func New(keyIn []byte, forceDecode bool) cipher.AEAD { - if len(keyIn) != keyLen { - log.Panicf("Only %d-byte keys are supported", keyLen) - } - // Create a private copy of the key - key := append([]byte{}, keyIn...) - return &StupidGCM{key: key, forceDecode: forceDecode} -} - -// NonceSize returns the required size of the nonce / IV. -func (g *StupidGCM) NonceSize() int { - return ivLen -} - -// Overhead returns the number of bytes that are added for authentication. -func (g *StupidGCM) Overhead() int { - return tagLen -} - -// Seal encrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst" -func (g *StupidGCM) Seal(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) []byte { - if len(iv) != ivLen { - log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported", ivLen) - } - if len(in) == 0 { - log.Panic("Zero-length input data is not supported") - } - if len(g.key) != keyLen { - log.Panicf("Wrong key length: %d. Key has been wiped?", len(g.key)) - } - - // If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer - outLen := len(in) + tagLen - var buf []byte - inplace := false - if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen { - inplace = true - buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen] - } else { - buf = make([]byte, outLen) - } - - C.aead_seal(C.aeadTypeGcm, - (*C.uchar)(&in[0]), - C.int(len(in)), - (*C.uchar)(&authData[0]), - C.int(len(authData)), - (*C.uchar)(&g.key[0]), - C.int(len(g.key)), - (*C.uchar)(&iv[0]), - C.int(len(iv)), - (*C.uchar)(&buf[0]), - C.int(len(buf))) - - if inplace { - return dst[:len(dst)+outLen] - } - return append(dst, buf...) -} - -// Open decrypts "in" using "iv" and "authData" and append the result to "dst" -func (g *StupidGCM) Open(dst, iv, in, authData []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if len(iv) != ivLen { - log.Panicf("Only %d-byte IVs are supported", ivLen) - } - if len(g.key) != keyLen { - log.Panicf("Wrong key length: %d. Key has been wiped?", len(g.key)) - } - if len(in) <= tagLen { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("stupidgcm: input data too short (%d bytes)", len(in)) - } - - // If the "dst" slice is large enough we can use it as our output buffer - outLen := len(in) - tagLen - var buf []byte - inplace := false - if cap(dst)-len(dst) >= outLen { - inplace = true - buf = dst[len(dst) : len(dst)+outLen] - } else { - buf = make([]byte, len(in)-tagLen) - } - - ciphertext := in[:len(in)-tagLen] - tag := in[len(in)-tagLen:] - - // https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/EVP_Authenticated_Encryption_and_Decryption#Authenticated_Encryption_using_GCM_mode - - // Create scratch space "context" - ctx := C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() - if ctx == nil { - log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed") - } - - // Set cipher to AES-256 - if C.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, C.EVP_aes_256_gcm(), nil, nil, nil) != 1 { - log.Panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex I failed") - } - - // Use 16-byte IV - if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, ivLen, nil) != 1 { - log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN failed") - } - - // Set key and IV - if C.EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, nil, nil, (*C.uchar)(&g.key[0]), (*C.uchar)(&iv[0])) != 1 { - log.Panic("EVP_DecryptInit_ex II failed") - } - - // Set expected GMAC tag - if C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, C.EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tagLen, (unsafe.Pointer)(&tag[0])) != 1 { - log.Panic("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl failed") - } - - // Provide authentication data - var resultLen C.int - if C.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, nil, &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&authData[0]), C.int(len(authData))) != 1 { - log.Panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate authData failed") - } - if int(resultLen) != len(authData) { - log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen) - } - - // Decrypt "ciphertext" into "buf" - if C.EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&buf[0]), &resultLen, (*C.uchar)(&ciphertext[0]), C.int(len(ciphertext))) != 1 { - log.Panic("EVP_DecryptUpdate failed") - } - if int(resultLen) != len(ciphertext) { - log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen) - } - - // Check GMAC - dummy := make([]byte, 16) - res := C.EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, (*C.uchar)(&dummy[0]), &resultLen) - if resultLen != 0 { - log.Panicf("Unexpected length %d", resultLen) - } - - // Free scratch space - C.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx) - - if res != 1 { - // The error code must always be checked by the calling function, because the decrypted buffer - // may contain corrupted data that we are returning in case the user forced reads - if g.forceDecode { - return append(dst, buf...), ErrAuth - } - return nil, ErrAuth - } - - if inplace { - return dst[:len(dst)+outLen], nil - } - return append(dst, buf...), nil -} - -// Wipe tries to wipe the AES key from memory by overwriting it with zeros -// and setting the reference to nil. -// -// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but -// still raises the bar for extracting the key. -func (g *StupidGCM) Wipe() { - for i := range g.key { - g.key[i] = 0 - } - g.key = nil -} -- cgit v1.2.3