Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Now symlink-safe through Readlinkat().
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Interestingly, little or no performance impact:
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.39W: gocryptfs v1.6-42-g30c2349-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-66-g6df8ddc; 2018-11-04 go1.11
Downloading linux-3.0.tar.gz
/tmp/linux-3.0.tar.gz 100%[=========================================================================>] 92.20M 2.93MB/s in 31s
2018-11-04 21:44:44 URL:https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/linux-3.0.tar.gz [96675825/96675825] -> "/tmp/linux-3.0.tar.gz" [1]
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.1808 s, 222 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.866438 s, 303 MB/s
UNTAR: 24.745
MD5: 12.050
LS: 3.525
RM: 9.544
Note: kernel has been updated:
$ uname -a
Linux brikett 4.18.16-200.fc28.x86_64 #1 SMP Sat Oct 20 23:53:47 UTC 2018 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
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Instead of calling syscall.Open() ourselves, rely on
openBackingDir().
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Use openBackingDir() and Fstatat().
High performance impact, though part of it should be
mitigated by adding DirIV caching to the new code paths.
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.Eou: gocryptfs v1.6-37-ge3914b3-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-66-g6df8ddc; 2018-10-14 go1.11
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.2289 s, 213 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.02616 s, 255 MB/s
UNTAR: 24.490
MD5: 13.120
LS: 3.368
RM: 9.232
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openBackingDir() used encryptPath(), which is not symlink-safe
itself. Drop encryptPath() and implement our own directory walk.
Adds three seconds to untar and two seconds to rm:
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.MzG: gocryptfs v1.6-36-g8fb3c2f-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-66-g6df8ddc; 2018-10-14 go1.11
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.25078 s, 210 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.0318 s, 254 MB/s
UNTAR: 20.941
MD5: 11.568
LS: 1.638
RM: 5.337
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Document which FUSE calls are already symlink-safe in
the function comment.
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DecryptPath is now symlink-safe through the use of *at()
functions.
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Make Access() symlink-safe through use of faccessat.
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So the reader does not have to read through the whole ticket.
The commit message has a nice summary of the problem.
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master key.
Further raises the bar for recovering keys from memory.
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Mostly detected with the 'codespell' utility, but also includes some
manual grammar fixes.
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The same condition is already checked a few lines above, and 'err' is not
changed inbetween.
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The directory was already created, so return success even if Fchownat fails.
The same error handling is already used if fs.args.PlaintextNames is false.
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Due to a copy-paste error, we ran the wrong test in the
subprocess.
Thanks @slackner for noticing at
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/commit/295d432175292dbaef572093d784aab55f5c0b8f#r31690478 !
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Allows better error handling, gets rid of the call to an
external program, and fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/278 .
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Old XFS filesystems always return DT_UNKNOWN. Downgrade the message
to "info" level if we are on XFS.
Using the "warning" level means that users on old XFS filesystems
cannot run the test suite as it intentionally aborts on any
warnings.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/267
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When gocryptfs was started on a terminal and later
daemonized, the color codes stayed active in the syslog
output.
The codes are not visible in "journalctl -f", which is why
I have not noticed it yet, but they do show up in normal
syslog as the usual "#033[33m" crap.
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Also log inode number, fd number, offset and length.
Maybe help debugging https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/269 .
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Even though filesystem notifications aren't implemented for FUSE, I decided to
try my hand at implementing the autounmount feature (#128). I based it on the
EncFS autounmount code, which records filesystem accesses and checks every X
seconds whether it's idled long enough to unmount.
I've tested the feature locally, but I haven't added any tests for this flag.
I also haven't worked with Go before. So please let me know if there's
anything that should be done differently.
One particular concern: I worked from the assumption that the open files table
is unique per-filesystem. If that's not true, I'll need to add an open file
count and associated lock to the Filesystem type instead.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/265
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MacOS and old XFS versions do not support very long symlinks,
but let's not make the tests fail because of that.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/267
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Error was:
# github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:179: cannot use perms | 256 (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscall.Fchmod
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:185: cannot use perms (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscall.Fchmod
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Use Openat() and the openBackingDir() helper so we
never follow symlinks.
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Use Openat() and the openBackingDir() helper so we
never follow symlinks.
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Close was missing.
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Named parameters make using the function easier.
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Directly use int file descriptors for the dirfd
and get rid of one level of indirection.
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The messages we print through tlog sometimes do, sometimes do
not contain a trailing newline. The stdlib logger usually drops
trailing newlines automatically, but tlog postfixes ColorReset to
the caller's message, so the logger logic does not work when we
print colored output.
Drop the newlines on our own, and add a test.
Fixes the blank lines in fsck output:
~/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/tests/fsck$ ./run_fsck.bash
Reading password from extpass program
Decrypting master key
OpenDir "": invalid entry "invalid_file_name.3": illegal base64 data at input byte 17
OpenDir "": invalid entry "invalid_file_name_2": bad message
fsck: corrupt entry in dir "": "invalid_file_name.3"
fsck: corrupt entry in dir "": "invalid_file_name_2"
OpenDir "": invalid entry "invalid_file_name____1": bad message
fsck: corrupt entry in dir "": "invalid_file_name____1"
doRead 4327225: corrupt block #0: stupidgcm: message authentication failed
fsck: error reading file "corrupt_file" (inum 4327225): 5=input/output error
cipherSize 40 < overhead 50: corrupt file
doRead 4327074: corrupt header: ParseHeader: invalid version, want=2 have=22616
cipherSize 40 < overhead 50: corrupt file
fsck: error reading file "corrupt_file_2" (inum 4327074): 5=input/output error
Readlink "s-P7PcQDUcVkoeMDnC3EYA": decrypting target failed: stupidgcm: message authentication failed
fsck: error reading symlink "corrupt_symlink": 5=input/output error
Readlink "iI0MtUdzELPeOAZYwYZFee169hpGgd3l2PXQBcc9sl4": decrypting target failed: illegal base64 data at input byte 0
fsck: error reading symlink "corrupt_symlink_2": 5=input/output error
OpenDir "yrwcjj2qoC4IYvhw9sbfRg": could not read gocryptfs.diriv: wanted 16 bytes, got 17
fsck: error opening dir "diriv_too_long": 5=input/output error
OpenDir "trqecbMNXdzLqzpk7fSfKw": could not read gocryptfs.diriv: wanted 16 bytes, got 3
fsck: error opening dir "diriv_too_short": 5=input/output error
cipherSize 8 < header size 18: corrupt file
readFileID 4327049: incomplete file, got 8 instead of 19 bytes
fsck: corrupt file "incomplete_file_1" (inode 4327049)
readFileID 4327038: incomplete file, got 18 instead of 19 bytes
fsck: corrupt file "incomplete_file_2" (inode 4327038)
cipherSize 1 < header size 18: corrupt file
readFileID 4327063: incomplete file, got 1 instead of 19 bytes
fsck: corrupt file "incomplete_file_3" (inode 4327063)
fsck: error opening dir "missing_diriv": 2=no such file or directory
ListXAttr: invalid xattr name "user.gocryptfs.0a5e7yWl0SGUGeWB0Sy2K0": bad message
fsck: corrupt xattr name on file "xattr_corrupt_name": "user.gocryptfs.0a5e7yWl0SGUGeWB0Sy2K0"
GetXAttr: stupidgcm: message authentication failed
fsck: error reading xattr "user.foo" from "xattr_corrupt_value": 5=input/output error
fsck summary: 15 corrupt files
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Check for O_NWFOLLOW and O_EXCL separately to
make the logic clearer.
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Rename openBackingPath to openBackingDir and use OpenDirNofollow
to be safe against symlink races. Note that openBackingDir is
not used in several important code paths like Create().
But it is used in Unlink, and the performance impact in the RM benchmark
to be acceptable:
Before
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.bYO: gocryptfs v1.6-12-g930c37e-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.07979 s, 243 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.882413 s, 297 MB/s
UNTAR: 16.703
MD5: 7.606
LS: 1.349
RM: 3.237
After
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.jK3: gocryptfs v1.6-13-g84d6faf-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.06261 s, 247 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.947228 s, 277 MB/s
UNTAR: 17.197
MD5: 7.540
LS: 1.364
RM: 3.410
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This fixes the "0100 directory" problem in reverse mode,
and should be slightly faster.
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The function used to do two things:
1) Walk the directory tree in a manner safe from symlink attacks
2) Open the final component in the mode requested by the caller
This change drops (2), which was only used once, and lets the caller
handle it. This simplifies the function and makes it fit for reuse in
forward mode in openBackingPath(), and for using O_PATH on Linux.
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Callers that do not want to decrypt the masterkey should
call plain Load().
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/258
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Preparation for fixing https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/258
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Report the actual problem instead of a generic
"unexpected end of JSON input".
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/258
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These were silently ignored until now (!) but
are rejected by Go 1.11 stdlib.
Drop the flags so the tests work again, until
we figure out a better solution.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20130
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Show enable_trezor in the version string if we were compiled
with `-tags enable_trezor`. And hide the `-trezor` flag from
the help output if we were not.
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Errors from zeroPad were ignored until now, as discovered
using xfstests generic/083.
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This is most likely a mistake by the user. Reject it.
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https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/235
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Before:
$ gocryptfs -fsck .
LoadConfFile: ReadFile: &os.PathError{Op:"open", Path:"/var/tmp/check-gocryptfs/scratchdev/gocryptfs.conf", Err:0xd}
Cannot open config file: open /var/tmp/check-gocryptfs/scratchdev/gocryptfs.conf: permission denied
After:
$ gocryptfs -fsck .
Cannot open config file: open /var/tmp/check-gocryptfs/scratchdev/gocryptfs.conf: permission denied
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As uncovered by xfstests generic/465, concurrent reads and writes
could lead to this,
doRead 3015532: corrupt block #1039: stupidgcm: message authentication failed,
as the read could pick up a block that has not yet been completely written -
write() is not atomic!
Now writes take ContentLock exclusively, while reads take it shared,
meaning that multiple reads can run in parallel with each other, but
not with a write.
This also simplifies the file header locking.
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xfstests generic/083 fills the filesystem almost completely while
running fsstress in parallel. In fsck, these would show up:
readFileID 2580: incomplete file, got 18 instead of 19 bytes
This could happen when writing the file header works, but writing
the actual data fails.
Now we kill the header again by truncating the file to zero.
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Other writers are blocked by ContentLock already.
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