Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
The messages we print through tlog sometimes do, sometimes do
not contain a trailing newline. The stdlib logger usually drops
trailing newlines automatically, but tlog postfixes ColorReset to
the caller's message, so the logger logic does not work when we
print colored output.
Drop the newlines on our own, and add a test.
Fixes the blank lines in fsck output:
~/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/tests/fsck$ ./run_fsck.bash
Reading password from extpass program
Decrypting master key
OpenDir "": invalid entry "invalid_file_name.3": illegal base64 data at input byte 17
OpenDir "": invalid entry "invalid_file_name_2": bad message
fsck: corrupt entry in dir "": "invalid_file_name.3"
fsck: corrupt entry in dir "": "invalid_file_name_2"
OpenDir "": invalid entry "invalid_file_name____1": bad message
fsck: corrupt entry in dir "": "invalid_file_name____1"
doRead 4327225: corrupt block #0: stupidgcm: message authentication failed
fsck: error reading file "corrupt_file" (inum 4327225): 5=input/output error
cipherSize 40 < overhead 50: corrupt file
doRead 4327074: corrupt header: ParseHeader: invalid version, want=2 have=22616
cipherSize 40 < overhead 50: corrupt file
fsck: error reading file "corrupt_file_2" (inum 4327074): 5=input/output error
Readlink "s-P7PcQDUcVkoeMDnC3EYA": decrypting target failed: stupidgcm: message authentication failed
fsck: error reading symlink "corrupt_symlink": 5=input/output error
Readlink "iI0MtUdzELPeOAZYwYZFee169hpGgd3l2PXQBcc9sl4": decrypting target failed: illegal base64 data at input byte 0
fsck: error reading symlink "corrupt_symlink_2": 5=input/output error
OpenDir "yrwcjj2qoC4IYvhw9sbfRg": could not read gocryptfs.diriv: wanted 16 bytes, got 17
fsck: error opening dir "diriv_too_long": 5=input/output error
OpenDir "trqecbMNXdzLqzpk7fSfKw": could not read gocryptfs.diriv: wanted 16 bytes, got 3
fsck: error opening dir "diriv_too_short": 5=input/output error
cipherSize 8 < header size 18: corrupt file
readFileID 4327049: incomplete file, got 8 instead of 19 bytes
fsck: corrupt file "incomplete_file_1" (inode 4327049)
readFileID 4327038: incomplete file, got 18 instead of 19 bytes
fsck: corrupt file "incomplete_file_2" (inode 4327038)
cipherSize 1 < header size 18: corrupt file
readFileID 4327063: incomplete file, got 1 instead of 19 bytes
fsck: corrupt file "incomplete_file_3" (inode 4327063)
fsck: error opening dir "missing_diriv": 2=no such file or directory
ListXAttr: invalid xattr name "user.gocryptfs.0a5e7yWl0SGUGeWB0Sy2K0": bad message
fsck: corrupt xattr name on file "xattr_corrupt_name": "user.gocryptfs.0a5e7yWl0SGUGeWB0Sy2K0"
GetXAttr: stupidgcm: message authentication failed
fsck: error reading xattr "user.foo" from "xattr_corrupt_value": 5=input/output error
fsck summary: 15 corrupt files
|
|
Check for O_NWFOLLOW and O_EXCL separately to
make the logic clearer.
|
|
Rename openBackingPath to openBackingDir and use OpenDirNofollow
to be safe against symlink races. Note that openBackingDir is
not used in several important code paths like Create().
But it is used in Unlink, and the performance impact in the RM benchmark
to be acceptable:
Before
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.bYO: gocryptfs v1.6-12-g930c37e-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.07979 s, 243 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.882413 s, 297 MB/s
UNTAR: 16.703
MD5: 7.606
LS: 1.349
RM: 3.237
After
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.jK3: gocryptfs v1.6-13-g84d6faf-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.06261 s, 247 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.947228 s, 277 MB/s
UNTAR: 17.197
MD5: 7.540
LS: 1.364
RM: 3.410
|
|
This fixes the "0100 directory" problem in reverse mode,
and should be slightly faster.
|
|
The function used to do two things:
1) Walk the directory tree in a manner safe from symlink attacks
2) Open the final component in the mode requested by the caller
This change drops (2), which was only used once, and lets the caller
handle it. This simplifies the function and makes it fit for reuse in
forward mode in openBackingPath(), and for using O_PATH on Linux.
|
|
Callers that do not want to decrypt the masterkey should
call plain Load().
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/258
|
|
Preparation for fixing https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/258
|
|
Report the actual problem instead of a generic
"unexpected end of JSON input".
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/258
|
|
These were silently ignored until now (!) but
are rejected by Go 1.11 stdlib.
Drop the flags so the tests work again, until
we figure out a better solution.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20130
|
|
Show enable_trezor in the version string if we were compiled
with `-tags enable_trezor`. And hide the `-trezor` flag from
the help output if we were not.
|
|
Errors from zeroPad were ignored until now, as discovered
using xfstests generic/083.
|
|
This is most likely a mistake by the user. Reject it.
|
|
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/235
|
|
Before:
$ gocryptfs -fsck .
LoadConfFile: ReadFile: &os.PathError{Op:"open", Path:"/var/tmp/check-gocryptfs/scratchdev/gocryptfs.conf", Err:0xd}
Cannot open config file: open /var/tmp/check-gocryptfs/scratchdev/gocryptfs.conf: permission denied
After:
$ gocryptfs -fsck .
Cannot open config file: open /var/tmp/check-gocryptfs/scratchdev/gocryptfs.conf: permission denied
|
|
As uncovered by xfstests generic/465, concurrent reads and writes
could lead to this,
doRead 3015532: corrupt block #1039: stupidgcm: message authentication failed,
as the read could pick up a block that has not yet been completely written -
write() is not atomic!
Now writes take ContentLock exclusively, while reads take it shared,
meaning that multiple reads can run in parallel with each other, but
not with a write.
This also simplifies the file header locking.
|
|
xfstests generic/083 fills the filesystem almost completely while
running fsstress in parallel. In fsck, these would show up:
readFileID 2580: incomplete file, got 18 instead of 19 bytes
This could happen when writing the file header works, but writing
the actual data fails.
Now we kill the header again by truncating the file to zero.
|
|
Other writers are blocked by ContentLock already.
|
|
If the underlying filesystem is full, writing to gocryptfs.diriv may
fail, and later fsck show this:
OpenDir "xyz": could not read gocryptfs.diriv: wanted 16 bytes, got 0
Uncovered by xfstests generic/083.
Also fixes a fd leak in the error path.
|
|
File holes and -fsck can cause unaligned read accesses, which means
we have to decrypt one extra plaintext block.
xfstests generic/083 manage to crash -fsck like this:
generic/083 2018/07/14 15:25:21 wrong len=266240, want=131072
panic: wrong len=266240, want=131072
goroutine 1 [running]:
log.Panicf(0x67fc00, 0x15, 0xc4204fec90, 0x2, 0x2)
/usr/local/go/src/log/log.go:333 +0xda
github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/contentenc.(*bPool).Put(0xc4200d4800, 0xc4202f2000, 0x21000, 0x41000)
/home/jakob/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/contentenc/bpool.go:27 +0x15d
github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend.(*File).doRead(0xc4200b4500, 0xc42019e000, 0x0, 0x20000, 0x28400, 0x20000, 0xc42019e000, 0xc4204ff008, 0x435164, 0xc420000180)
/home/jakob/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend/file.go:227 +0xba9
github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend.(*File).Read(0xc4200b4500, 0xc42019e000, 0x20000, 0x20000, 0x28400, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
/home/jakob/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend/file.go:246 +0x23e
main.(*fsckObj).file(0xc420069320, 0xc42001a630, 0x21)
/home/jakob/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/fsck.go:126 +0x21f
main.(*fsckObj).dir(0xc420069320, 0xc420014dc0, 0x1d)
/home/jakob/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/fsck.go:76 +0x387
main.(*fsckObj).dir(0xc420069320, 0xc42021dae0, 0x19)
/home/jakob/go/src/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/fsck.go:74 +0x347
|
|
If the underlying filesystem is full, it is normal get ENOSPC here.
Log at Info level instead of Warning.
Fixes xfstests generic/015 and generic/027, which complained about
the extra output.
|
|
O_DIRECT has no direct equivalent on MacOS
(check out https://github.com/libuv/libuv/issues/1600 for details).
Just define it to zero there.
|
|
O_DIRECT accesses must be aligned in both offset and length. Due to our
crypto header, alignment will be off, even if userspace makes aligned
accesses. Running xfstests generic/013 on ext4 used to trigger lots of
EINVAL errors due to missing alignment. Just fall back to buffered IO.
|
|
The message causes output mismatches in xfstests generic/112.
Downgrade the severity to Info so it gets disabled when using "-q".
|
|
|
|
The trezor libraries are not yet stable enough to build
gocryptfs with trezor support by default.
It does not even compile at the moment:
$ ./build.bash -tags enable_trezor
# github.com/conejoninja/tesoro/vendor/github.com/trezor/usbhid
../../conejoninja/tesoro/vendor/github.com/trezor/usbhid/hid.go:32:11: fatal error: os/threads_posix.c: No such file or directory
#include "os/threads_posix.c"
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
compilation terminated.
https://github.com/conejoninja/tesoro/issues/9
|
|
This function will enable "gocryptfs -fsck" to handle
sparse files efficiently.
|
|
"gocryptfs -fsck" will need access to helper functions,
and to get that, it will need to cast a gofuse.File to a
fusefrontend.File. Make fusefrontend.File exported to make
this work.
|
|
Make it clear that this channel is only used to report corruptions
that are transparently mitigated and do not return an error to
the user.
|
|
It is no longer printed at all when mounting a filesystem,
printing on -init can be disabled with -q.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/76
|
|
Check that the value has changed, is not all-zero
and has the right length.
|
|
|
|
TrezorPayload stores 32 random bytes used for unlocking
the master key using a Trezor security module. The randomness makes sure
that a unique unlock value is used for each gocryptfs filesystem.
|
|
configfile.LoadConfFile() -> configfile.Load()
configfile.CreateConfFile() -> configfile.Create()
|
|
readpassword.Trezor() is not implemented yet and returns
a hardcoded dummy key.
|
|
|
|
We are clean again.
Warnings were:
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:443:14: should omit type string from declaration
of var cTarget; it will be inferred from the right-hand side
internal/fusefrontend/xattr.go:26:1: comment on exported method FS.GetXAttr
should be of the form "GetXAttr ..."
internal/syscallcompat/sys_common.go:9:7: exported const PATH_MAX should have
comment or be unexported
|
|
Reading system.posix_acl_access and system.posix_acl_default
should return EOPNOTSUPP to inform user-space that we do not
support ACLs.
xftestest essientially does
chacl -l | grep "Operation not supported"
to determine if the filesystem supports ACLs, and used to
wrongly believe that gocryptfs does.
|
|
Define our own, with the value from Linux.
|
|
Support has been merged into the xattr package
( https://github.com/pkg/xattr/pull/29 ), use it.
|
|
mv is unhappy when we return EPERM when it tries to set
system.posix_acl_access:
mv: preserving permissions for ‘b/x’: Operation not permitted
Now we return EOPNOTSUPP like tmpfs does and mv seems happy.
|
|
Values a binary-safe, there is no need to base64-encode them.
Old, base64-encoded values are supported transparently
on reading. Writing xattr values now always writes them binary.
|
|
This is what Go GCM does as well.
|
|
Pass the "flags" parameter to the lower layer syscall.
This makes Apple applications being able to successfully save data.
|
|
We previously returned EPERM to prevent the kernel from
blacklisting our xattr support once we get an unsupported
flag, but this causes lots of trouble on MacOS:
Cannot save files from GUI apps, see
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/229
Returning ENOSYS triggers the dotfiles fallback on MacOS
and fixes the issue.
|
|
* Fixed xattr filtering for MacOS. "system." and "user." prefixes are only relevant for Linux.
* Small cleanup and additional tests.
|
|
Reported by https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs
|
|
OpenDir and ListXAttr skip over corrupt entries,
readFileID treats files the are too small as empty.
This improves usability in the face of corruption,
but hides the problem in a log message instead of
putting it in the return code.
Create a channel to report these corruptions to fsck
so it can report them to the user.
Also update the manpage and the changelog with the -fsck option.
Closes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/191
|
|
"ls -l" queries security.selinux, system.posix_acl_access, system.posix_acl_default
and throws error messages if it gets something else than ENODATA.
|
|
|
|
Make sure we get only 1 warning output per
problem.
Also, add new corruption types to broken_fs_v1.4.
|