Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
MacOS sprinkles .DS_Store files everywhere. This is hard to avoid for
users, so handle it transparently in Rmdir().
Mitigates https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/140
|
|
Handle the errors first so that the normal code path is not indented.
This should not cause any behavoir changes.
|
|
MacOS creates lots of these files, and if the directory is otherwise
empty, we would throw an IO error to the unsuspecting user.
With this patch, we log a warning, but otherwise pretend we did not
see it.
Mitigates https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/140
|
|
...and if Getdents is not available at all.
Due to this warning I now know that SSHFS always returns DT_UNKNOWN:
gocryptfs[8129]: Getdents: convertDType: received DT_UNKNOWN, falling back to Lstat
This behavoir is confirmed at http://ahefner.livejournal.com/16875.html:
"With sshfs, I finally found that obscure case. The dtype is always set to DT_UNKNOWN [...]"
|
|
Previously, OpenDir() did not use the cache at all, missing
an opportunity to speed up repeated directory reads.
|
|
Getdents avoids calling Lstat on each file.
|
|
Remove the "Masterkey" field from fusefrontend.Args because it
should not be stored longer than neccessary. Instead pass the
masterkey as a separate argument to the filesystem initializers.
Then overwrite it with zeros immediately so we don't have
to wait for garbage collection.
Note that the crypto implementation still stores at least a
masterkey-derived value, so this change makes it harder, but not
impossible, to extract the encryption keys from memory.
Suggested at https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/137
|
|
Due to RMW, we always need read permissions on the backing file. This is a
problem if the file permissions do not allow reading (i.e. 0200 permissions).
This patch works around that problem by chmod'ing the file, obtaining a fd,
and chmod'ing it back.
Test included.
Issue reported at: https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/125
|
|
Previously we ran through the decryption steps even for an empty
ciphertext slice. The functions handle it correctly, but returning
early skips all the extra calls.
Speeds up the tar extract benchmark by about 4%.
|
|
This gets us a massive speed boost in streaming reads.
|
|
Easily saves lots of allocations.
|
|
This will allow us to return internal buffers to a pool.
|
|
bPool verifies the lengths of slices going in and out.
Also, add a plaintext block pool - pBlockPool - and use
it for decryption.
|
|
We use two levels of buffers:
1) 4kiB+overhead for each ciphertext block
2) 128kiB+overhead for each FUSE write (32 ciphertext blocks)
This commit adds a sync.Pool for both levels.
The memory-efficiency for small writes could be improved,
as we now always use a 128kiB buffer.
|
|
|
|
Collect all the plaintext and pass everything to contentenc in
one call.
This will allow easier parallization of the encryption.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/116
|
|
|
|
This fixes a few issues I have found reviewing the code:
1) Limit the amount of data ReadLongName() will read. Previously,
you could send gocryptfs into out-of-memory by symlinking
gocryptfs.diriv to /dev/zero.
2) Handle the empty input case in unPad16() by returning an
error. Previously, it would panic with an out-of-bounds array
read. It is unclear to me if this could actually be triggered.
3) Reject empty names after base64-decoding in DecryptName().
An empty name crashes emeCipher.Decrypt().
It is unclear to me if B64.DecodeString() can actually return
a non-error empty result, but let's guard against it anyway.
|
|
Closes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/84 .
|
|
nametransform.DecryptName() now always returns syscall.EBADMSG if
the name was invalid.
fusefrontend.OpenDir error messages have been normalized.
|
|
This usually indicates that the open file limit for gocryptfs is
too low. We should report this to the user.
|
|
...and IDLock to HeaderLock. This matches what the locks actually
protect.
|
|
Now that we embed nodefs.NewDefaultFile(), we can drop our own
no-ops.
|
|
We do not have to track the writeOnly status because the kernel
will not forward read requests on a write-only FD to us anyway.
I have verified this behavoir manually on a 4.10.8 kernel and also
added a testcase.
|
|
The open file table code needs some room to grow for the upcoming
FD multiplexing implementation.
|
|
The data structure was originally called write lock table, but
is now simply called the open file table. Rename the file to
reflect that.
|
|
This is a very old leftover.
|
|
|
|
...and fix a few golint issues and print a scary warning message on mount.
Also, force the fs to ro,noexec.
|
|
Force decode of encrypted files even if the integrity check fails, instead of
failing with an IO error. Warning messages are still printed to syslog if corrupted
files are encountered.
It can be useful to recover files from disks with bad sectors or other corrupted
media.
Closes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/102 .
|
|
go-fuse has added a new method to the nodefs.File interface that
caused this build error:
internal/fusefrontend/file.go:75: cannot use file literal (type *file) as type nodefs.File in return argument:
*file does not implement nodefs.File (missing Flock method)
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/104 and
prevents the problem from happening again.
|
|
The volatile inode numbers that we used before cause "find" to complain and error out.
Virtual inode numbers are derived from their parent file inode number by adding 10^19,
which is hopefully large enough no never cause problems in practice.
If the backing directory contains inode numbers higher than that, stat() on these files
will return EOVERFLOW.
Example directory lising after this change:
$ ls -i
926473 gocryptfs.conf
1000000000000926466 gocryptfs.diriv
944878 gocryptfs.longname.hmZojMqC6ns47eyVxLlH2ailKjN9bxfosi3C-FR8mjA
1000000000000944878 gocryptfs.longname.hmZojMqC6ns47eyVxLlH2ailKjN9bxfosi3C-FR8mjA.name
934408 Tdfbf02CKsTaGVYnAsSypA
|
|
|
|
Due to kernel readahead, we usually get multiple read requests
at the same time. These get submitted to the backing storage in
random order, which is a problem if seeking is very expensive.
Details: https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/92
|
|
A header-only file will be considered empty (this is not supposed to happen).
This makes File ID poisoning more difficult.
|
|
...if doWrite() can do it for us. This avoids the situation
that the file only consists of a file header when calling
doWrite.
A later patch will check for this condition and warn about it,
as with this change it should no longer occour in normal operation.
|
|
The symlink functions incorrectly hardcoded the padded
base64 variant.
|
|
...but keep it disabled by default for new filesystems.
We are still missing an example filesystem and CLI arguments
to explicitely enable and disable it.
|
|
There are two independent backends, one for name encryption,
the other one, AEAD, for file content.
"BackendTypeEnum" only applies to AEAD (file content), so make that
clear in the name.
|
|
Version 1.1 of the EME package (github.com/rfjakob/eme) added
a more convenient interface. Use it.
Note that you have to upgrade your EME package (go get -u)!
|
|
When filename encryption is active, every directory contains
a "gocryptfs.diriv" file. This file should also change the owner.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/86
|
|
|
|
This used to incorrectly try to link twice and return EEXIST.
|
|
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/64
|
|
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/64
|
|
This prevents (unlikely) symlink race attacks
|
|
Preallocation is very slow on hdds that run btrfs. Give the
user the option to disable it. This greatly speeds up small file
operations but reduces the robustness against out-of-space errors.
Also add the option to the man page.
More info: https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/63
|
|
This improves performance on hdds running ext4, and improves
streaming write performance on hdds running btrfs. Tar extract
slows down on btrfs for some reason.
See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/63
Benchmarks:
encfs v1.9.1
============
$ ./benchmark.bash -encfs /mnt/hdd-ext4
Testing EncFS at /mnt/hdd-ext4/benchmark.bash.u0g
WRITE: 131072000 bytes (131 MB, 125 MiB) copied, 1,48354 s, 88,4 MB/s
UNTAR: 20.79
LS: 3.04
RM: 6.62
$ ./benchmark.bash -encfs /mnt/hdd-btrfs
Testing EncFS at /mnt/hdd-btrfs/benchmark.bash.h40
WRITE: 131072000 bytes (131 MB, 125 MiB) copied, 1,52552 s, 85,9 MB/s
UNTAR: 24.51
LS: 2.73
RM: 5.32
gocryptfs v1.1.1-26-g4a7f8ef
============================
$ ./benchmark.bash /mnt/hdd-ext4
Testing gocryptfs at /mnt/hdd-ext4/benchmark.bash.1KG
WRITE: 131072000 bytes (131 MB, 125 MiB) copied, 1,55782 s, 84,1 MB/s
UNTAR: 22.23
LS: 1.47
RM: 4.17
$ ./benchmark.bash /mnt/hdd-btrfs
Testing gocryptfs at /mnt/hdd-btrfs/benchmark.bash.2t8
WRITE: 131072000 bytes (131 MB, 125 MiB) copied, 6,87206 s, 19,1 MB/s
UNTAR: 69.87
LS: 1.52
RM: 5.33
gocryptfs v1.1.1-32
===================
$ ./benchmark.bash /mnt/hdd-ext4
Testing gocryptfs at /mnt/hdd-ext4/benchmark.bash.Qt3
WRITE: 131072000 bytes (131 MB, 125 MiB) copied, 1,22577 s, 107 MB/s
UNTAR: 23.46
LS: 1.46
RM: 4.67
$ ./benchmark.bash /mnt/hdd-btrfs/
Testing gocryptfs at /mnt/hdd-btrfs//benchmark.bash.XVk
WRITE: 131072000 bytes (131 MB, 125 MiB) copied, 3,68735 s, 35,5 MB/s
UNTAR: 116.87
LS: 1.84
RM: 6.34
|
|
|
|
This fixes the problem that a truncate can reset the file
ID without the other open FDs noticing it.
|