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Revert commit b22cc03c7516b2003880db8375d26c76d6dff093.
Instead of manually adjusting the user and mode after creating the
file, adjust effective permissions and let the kernel deal with it.
Related to https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/338.
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The current code has a risk of race-conditions, since we pass a path
containing "/" to Fchownat. We could fix this by opening a file descriptor,
however, this does not seem worth the effort. We also don't chown *.name files.
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Reported by @slackner at https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/327 :
Possible race-conditions between file creation and Fchownat
* Assume a system contains a gocryptfs mount as root user
with -allow_other
* As a regular user create a new file with mode containing
the SUID flag and write access for other users
* Before gocryptfs executes the Fchownat call, try to open
the file again, write some exploit code to it, and try to run it.
For a short time, the file is owned by root and has the SUID flag, so
this is pretty dangerous.
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Use O_ACCMODE mask in openWriteOnlyFile for improved readability.
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Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/328
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We alread have this warning in Open(), but xfstests generic/488
causes "too many open files" via Create. Add the same message so
the user sees what is going on.
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Found with the 'codespell' utility.
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This function is in all fastpaths, will get a cache, and needs
its own file.
renamed: internal/fusefrontend/names.go -> internal/fusefrontend/openbackingdir.go
renamed: internal/fusefrontend/names_test.go -> internal/fusefrontend/openbackingdir_test.go
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* listxattr is fixed via the /proc/self/fd trick
* setxattr,removexattr are fixed by opening the file O_WRONLY
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/308
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Thanks @slackner!
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/306
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unix.UtimesNanoAt now also exists on Darwin, yay!
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No changes needed.
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Now uses Unlinkat.
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And also rename DeleteLongName() -> DeleteLongNameAt(). The
naming follow the names open the openat() etc syscalls.
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Now symlink-safe through Readlinkat().
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Use openBackingDir() and Fstatat().
High performance impact, though part of it should be
mitigated by adding DirIV caching to the new code paths.
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.Eou: gocryptfs v1.6-37-ge3914b3-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-66-g6df8ddc; 2018-10-14 go1.11
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.2289 s, 213 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.02616 s, 255 MB/s
UNTAR: 24.490
MD5: 13.120
LS: 3.368
RM: 9.232
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Document which FUSE calls are already symlink-safe in
the function comment.
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Make Access() symlink-safe through use of faccessat.
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Even though filesystem notifications aren't implemented for FUSE, I decided to
try my hand at implementing the autounmount feature (#128). I based it on the
EncFS autounmount code, which records filesystem accesses and checks every X
seconds whether it's idled long enough to unmount.
I've tested the feature locally, but I haven't added any tests for this flag.
I also haven't worked with Go before. So please let me know if there's
anything that should be done differently.
One particular concern: I worked from the assumption that the open files table
is unique per-filesystem. If that's not true, I'll need to add an open file
count and associated lock to the Filesystem type instead.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/265
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Error was:
# github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/fusefrontend
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:179: cannot use perms | 256 (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscall.Fchmod
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:185: cannot use perms (type uint16) as type uint32 in argument to syscall.Fchmod
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Use Openat() and the openBackingDir() helper so we
never follow symlinks.
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Use Openat() and the openBackingDir() helper so we
never follow symlinks.
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Close was missing.
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Directly use int file descriptors for the dirfd
and get rid of one level of indirection.
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Rename openBackingPath to openBackingDir and use OpenDirNofollow
to be safe against symlink races. Note that openBackingDir is
not used in several important code paths like Create().
But it is used in Unlink, and the performance impact in the RM benchmark
to be acceptable:
Before
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.bYO: gocryptfs v1.6-12-g930c37e-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.07979 s, 243 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.882413 s, 297 MB/s
UNTAR: 16.703
MD5: 7.606
LS: 1.349
RM: 3.237
After
$ ./benchmark.bash
Testing gocryptfs at /tmp/benchmark.bash.jK3: gocryptfs v1.6-13-g84d6faf-dirty; go-fuse v20170619-49-gb11e293; 2018-09-08 go1.10.3
WRITE: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 1.06261 s, 247 MB/s
READ: 262144000 bytes (262 MB, 250 MiB) copied, 0.947228 s, 277 MB/s
UNTAR: 17.197
MD5: 7.540
LS: 1.364
RM: 3.410
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https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/235
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O_DIRECT has no direct equivalent on MacOS
(check out https://github.com/libuv/libuv/issues/1600 for details).
Just define it to zero there.
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O_DIRECT accesses must be aligned in both offset and length. Due to our
crypto header, alignment will be off, even if userspace makes aligned
accesses. Running xfstests generic/013 on ext4 used to trigger lots of
EINVAL errors due to missing alignment. Just fall back to buffered IO.
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Make it clear that this channel is only used to report corruptions
that are transparently mitigated and do not return an error to
the user.
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We are clean again.
Warnings were:
internal/fusefrontend/fs.go:443:14: should omit type string from declaration
of var cTarget; it will be inferred from the right-hand side
internal/fusefrontend/xattr.go:26:1: comment on exported method FS.GetXAttr
should be of the form "GetXAttr ..."
internal/syscallcompat/sys_common.go:9:7: exported const PATH_MAX should have
comment or be unexported
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OpenDir and ListXAttr skip over corrupt entries,
readFileID treats files the are too small as empty.
This improves usability in the face of corruption,
but hides the problem in a log message instead of
putting it in the return code.
Create a channel to report these corruptions to fsck
so it can report them to the user.
Also update the manpage and the changelog with the -fsck option.
Closes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/191
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Make sure we get only 1 warning output per
problem.
Also, add new corruption types to broken_fs_v1.4.
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We handle empty files by storing an actual empty file
on disk. Handle xattrs similarily and encrypt the
empty value to the empty value.
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At the moment, only for reverse mode.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/217
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These will be reused by the upcoming xattr support.
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Both fusefrontend and fusefrontend_reverse were doing
essentially the same thing, move it into main's
initFuseFrontend.
A side-effect is that we have a reference to cryptocore
in main, which will help with wiping the keys on exit
(https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/211).
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gocryptfs.longname.XXX files were considered magic in PlaintextNames
mode, which was wrong.
Fix that and add tests.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/174
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In PlaintextNames mode the "gocryptfs.longname." prefix does not have any
special meaning.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/174
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...and fix the instances where the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW /
O_NOFOLLOW / O_EXCL flag was missing.
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In PlaintextNames mode the "gocryptfs.longname." prefix does not have any
special meaning. We should not attempt to delete any .name files.
Partially fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/174
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Mknod and Symlink
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