| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | 
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|  | (unused so far) | 
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|  | This file should only be readable by the owner and never be written to. | 
|  | A file never gets a cipherSize <= HEADER_LEN in normal operation.
However, this can happen if header write it interrupted or the
underlying filesystem does not support fallocate.
Noticed while trying to store a CIPHERDIR in another gocryptfs mount
(gocryptfs does not support fallocate) | 
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|  | // List of feature flags this filesystem has enabled.
// If gocryptfs encounters a feature flag it does not support, it will refuse
// mounting. This mechanism is analogous to the ext4 feature flags that are
// stored in the superblock.
FeatureFlags []string | 
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|  | Also run go fmt | 
|  | Also, forbid access to "gocryptfs.conf" in the root dir. | 
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|  | Also, gather all the command line arguments into an anonymous struct
"args". | 
|  | Move all the intelligence into the new file address_translation.go.
That the calculations were spread out too much became apparent when adding
the file header. This should make the code much easier to modify in the
future. | 
|  | Format: [ "Version" uint16 big endian ] [ "Id" 16 random bytes ]
Quoting SECURITY.md:
* Every file has a header that contains a 16-byte random *file id*
* Each block uses the file id and its block number as GCM *authentication data*
 * This means the position of the blocks is protected as well. The blocks
   can not be reordered or copied between different files without
   causing an decryption error. | 
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|  | This prevents that the user enters the password only to get an error
later. | 
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|  | ...also adapt the cryptfs tests for 256 bit long keys | 
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|  | AES-256 seems to be becoming the industry standard. While AES-128 is
good enough for tens of years to come, let's follow suit and be extra
safe. | 
|  | The shell wrapper sends gocryptfs into the background and waits for SIGUSR1 | 
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|  | The old implementation of counting up from a random starting
point had the problem that is allowed an attacker to find out
the write order of the blocks. | 
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|  | "Offset" is unclear whether it is an offset from the start of file
or start of block. "Skip" seems much better. | 
|  | Also, fix key, it is now []byte, not [16]byte | 
|  | The actual fix is
	oldSize := f.cfs.PlainSize(uint64(fi.Size()))
the rest is logging improvements | 
|  | Makes the log output smaller and more readable. | 
|  | Fixes xfstests generic/010
Note that file holes are not authenticated, | 
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|  | This fixes relative symlinks:
$ tar xf linux-4.2.tar.gz
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/vphn/vphn.h: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/vphn/vphn.c: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/stringloops/memcmp_64.S: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/primitives/word-at-a-time.h: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/primitives/asm/asm-compat.h: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/copyloops/memcpy_power7.S: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/copyloops/memcpy_64.S: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/copyloops/copyuser_power7.S: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/copyloops/copyuser_64.S: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/include/dt-bindings: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/arch/mips/boot/dts/include/dt-bindings: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/arch/metag/boot/dts/include/dt-bindings: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/arch/arm64/boot/dts/include/dt-bindings: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: linux-4.2/arch/arm/boot/dts/include/dt-bindings: Cannot utime: No such file or directory
tar: Exiting with failure status due to previous errors | 
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|  | The too-large reported value broke mmap
(applications saw appended zero bytes)
Also
* Add locking for all fd operations
* Add "--debug" command line switch | 
|  | Also, re-enable openssl and disable debug messages so testing
gocryptfs is less painful | 
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|  | Fix issues in read and write paths.
Now passes selftest. | 
|  | Currently fails main_test.go, will be fixed in part II | 
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