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128kiB = 32 x 4kiB pages is the maximum we get from the kernel. Splitting
up smaller writes is probably not worth it.
Parallelism is limited to two for now.
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Slight streaming write improvement.
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Spawn a worker goroutine that reads the next 512-byte block
while the current one is being drained.
This should help reduce waiting times when /dev/urandom is very
slow (like on Linux 3.16 kernels).
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Allows for quickly testing the streaming write throughput.
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Also, get rid of the half-empty line.
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On my machine, reading 512-byte blocks from /dev/urandom
(same via getentropy syscall) is a lot faster in terms of
throughput:
Blocksize Throughput
16 28.18 MB/s
512 83.75 MB/s
For a single-threaded streaming write, this drops the CPU usage of
nonceGenerator.Get to almost 1/3:
flat flat% sum% cum cum%
Before 0 0% 95.08% 0.35s 2.92% github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/cryptocore.(*nonceGenerator).Get
After 0.01s 0.092% 92.34% 0.13s 1.20% github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/cryptocore.(*nonceGenerator).Get
This change makes the nonce reading single-threaded, which may
hurt massively-parallel writes.
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This check would need locking to be multithreading-safe.
But as it is in the fastpath, just remove it.
rand.Read() already guarantees that the value is random.
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This allows easy parallelization in the future.
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Uses the runtime/trace functionality.
TODO: add to man page.
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No functional changes, just keeping the profiling-related flags
together.
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Creates a tar.gz with a static build of gocryptfs and the man page.
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This file has been obsolete for some time,
TODOs are no longer tracked here but on github.
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We got another warning for force_other:
cli_args.go:26:45: don't use underscores in Go names; struct field force_owner should be forceOwner
Use a broader grep.
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Collect all the plaintext and pass everything to contentenc in
one call.
This will allow easier parallization of the encryption.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/116
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Before Go 1.5, GOMAXPROCS defaulted to 1, hence it made
sense to unconditionally increase it to 4.
But since Go 1.5, GOMAXPROCS defaults to the number of cores,
so don't keep it from increasing above 4.
Also, update the performance numbers.
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One out-of-date and the other with a typo.
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Previously, it was at the go-fuse default of 64KiB. Getting
bigger writes should increase throughput somewhat.
Testing on tmpfs shows an improvement from 112MiB/s to 120MiB/s.
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Travis failed on Go 1.6.3 with this error:
internal/pathiv/pathiv_test.go:20: no args in Error call
This change should solve the problem and provides a better error
message on (real) test failure.
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Pretty-prints the config while stripping out sensitive
(and uninteresting) data
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/111
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We have accumulated so many options over time that they
no longer fit on the screen.
Display only a useful subset of options to the user unless
they pass "-hh".
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This was implemented in fusefrontend_reverse, but we need it
in fusefrontend as well. Move the algorithm into pathiv.BlockIV().
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We check the md5 sum of the encrypted version of a file to make sure we don't
accidentially change the ciphertext generation.
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...under the new name "FileIVs".
This will also be used by forward mode.
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We will also need it in forward mode.
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We now convert "CentOS release 5.11 (Final)"
to "CentOS_release_5.11_Final"
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/113
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...and also exit with the proper exit code when we get an error.
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Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/83
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RHEL and CentOS do not have /etc/os-release yet. Read from
/etc/redhat-release instead.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/113
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These should make it easier to re-implement the key derivation
that was enabled with the "HKDF" feature flag.
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With hard links, the path to a file is not unique. This means
that the ciphertext data depends on the path that is used to access
the files.
Fix that by storing the derived values when we encounter a hard-linked
file. This means that the first path wins.
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This should never happen in normal operation and is a sign of
data corruption. Catch it early.
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This should never happen in normal operation and is a sign of
data corruption. Catch it early.
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Log the message ourselves and return EINVAL.
Before:
gocryptfs[26962]: go-fuse: can't convert error type: ParseHeader: invalid version: got 0, want 2
After:
gocryptfs[617]: ParseHeader: invalid version: want 2, got 0. Returning EINVAL.
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Instead of redirecting stdout and stderr to /tmp/gocryptfs_paniclog,
where it is hard to find, redirect them to a newly spawned logger(1)
instance that forwards the messages to syslog.
See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/109 for an example
where the paniclog was lost due to a reboot.
Also, instead of closing stdin, redirect it to /dev/null, like most
daemons seem to do.
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This fixes a few issues I have found reviewing the code:
1) Limit the amount of data ReadLongName() will read. Previously,
you could send gocryptfs into out-of-memory by symlinking
gocryptfs.diriv to /dev/zero.
2) Handle the empty input case in unPad16() by returning an
error. Previously, it would panic with an out-of-bounds array
read. It is unclear to me if this could actually be triggered.
3) Reject empty names after base64-decoding in DecryptName().
An empty name crashes emeCipher.Decrypt().
It is unclear to me if B64.DecodeString() can actually return
a non-error empty result, but let's guard against it anyway.
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Exiting with a fatal error just pushes users to use "-nosyslog",
which is even worse than not having a paniclog.
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When a user calls into a deep directory hierarchy, we often
get a sequence like this from the kernel:
LOOKUP a
LOOKUP a/b
LOOKUP a/b/c
LOOKUP a/b/c/d
The diriv cache was not effective for this pattern, because it
was designed for this:
LOOKUP a/a
LOOKUP a/b
LOOKUP a/c
LOOKUP a/d
By also using the cached entry of the grandparent we can avoid lots
of diriv reads.
This benchmark is against a large encrypted directory hosted on NFS:
Before:
$ time ls -R nfs-backed-mount > /dev/null
real 1m35.976s
user 0m0.248s
sys 0m0.281s
After:
$ time ls -R nfs-backed-mount > /dev/null
real 1m3.670s
user 0m0.217s
sys 0m0.403s
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Needs a leading "..".
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All exit codes that are likely to occour are listed.
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New codes:
* OpenConf = 23
* WriteConf = 24
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Empty passwords are not allowed. Let's give the error
it's own exit code.
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Instead, create three new specific exit codes:
* FuseNewServer = 19
* CtlSock = 20
* PanicLogCreate = 21
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