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Fix for https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/351 was
just merged into go-fuse.
Closes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/351
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This also drops now-unused dependencies.
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Trezor support has been broken since Sept 2018
( https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/261 ).
Disable trezor.go by renaming to trezor.go.broken.
This keeps "dep" from having to pull in A LOT OF dependencies:
Before:
$ du -sh vendor/
49M vendor/
After:
$ du -sh vendor/
16M vendor/
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Get rid of one extra directory level. Hopefully makes it
easier to follow the debug logs.
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https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/349
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https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/347
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Regression test for https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/354
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This fixed the "Permission denied" bug, but still has the problem that
the directory may be replaced behind our back. Mitigated by the fact
that we skip the workaround when running as root with -allow_other.
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/354
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matrix_test.go is already too big.
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Breaks mounting on MacOS: unix.Faccessat on Darwin does NOT (yet)
support AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW. See d44fe89ba4f3252c5bd00c4f7730197732f2a26a .
This reverts commit 0805a63df1b5f915b228727f6074c2506922d0ad.
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unix.Faccessat has added support for AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in July 2018,
https://github.com/golang/sys/commit/bd9dbc187b6e1dacfdd2722a87e83093c2d7bd6e#diff-341484dbbe3180cd7a31ef2ad2d679b6
which means we no longer need our own helper.
Closes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/347
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In the error case, buf was not restored to the original
capacity. Instead of truncating "buf" and restoring (or forgetting to restore)
later, introduce the "data" slice.
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/356
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For Linux, everything effectively stays the same. For both path-based and
fd-based Utimens() calls, we use unix.UtimesNanoAt(). To avoid introducing
a separate syscall wrapper for futimens() (as done in go-fuse, for example),
we instead use the /proc/self/fd - trick.
On macOS, this changes quite a lot:
* Path-based Utimens() calls were previously completely broken, since
unix.UtimensNanoAt() ignores the passed file descriptor. Note that this
cannot be fixed easily since there IS no appropriate syscall available on
macOS prior to High Sierra (10.13). We emulate this case by using
Fchdir() + setattrlist().
* Fd-based Utimens() calls were previously translated to f.GetAttr() (to
fill any empty parameters) and syscall.Futimes(), which does not does
support nanosecond precision. Both issues can be fixed by switching to
fsetattrlist().
Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/350
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This avoids sporadic test failures on macOS.
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Fixes the following test failure:
cli_test.go:534: Failed to mount "[...]/542399800,foo,bar" on "[...]/542399800,foo,bar.mnt": exit status 19
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While we're at it, also replace os.* constants with syscall.* constants.
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This should get rid of
Openat: O_NOFOLLOW missing: flags = 0x0
Fchmodat: adding missing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag
sys_common_test.go:203: chmod on symlink should have failed, but did not. New mode=0333
UnmountErr: "[...]/057376762.mnt" was not found in MountInfo, cannot check for FD leak
and add some context to
--- FAIL: TestUtimesNano (0.00s)
matrix_test.go:628: no such file or directory
See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/343#issuecomment-453888006
for full test output
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FchmodatNofollow dropped the flags parameter.
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We never want Fchmodat to follow symlinks, so follow what
Qemu does, and call our function FchmodatNofollow.
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On macOS the function has a flags argument, so we don't need the
/proc/self/fd trick used on Linux.
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Fixes -allow_other mode on macOS.
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The only call forwarded to loopbackFileSystem was Statfs,
which is trivial to implement.
Implement it and drop loopbackFileSystem, as having it carries the
risk that a coding error bypasses the usual encryption/decryption
chain.
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Fixes mounting of forward mounts on macOS High Sierra.
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When gocryptfs runs as root, we don't want to allow people to create
SUID root files.
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Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/336 and
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/337.
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Instead of manually adjusting the user after creating the symlink,
adjust effective permissions and let the kernel deal with it.
Related to https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/338.
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Instead of manually adjusting the user and mode after creating the
device file, adjust effective permissions and let the kernel deal
with it.
Related to https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/338.
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Revert commit fcaca5fc94d981aa637beb752edc8cb3c2265e96.
Instead of manually adjusting the user and mode after creating the
directory, adjust effective permissions and let the kernel deal with it.
Related to https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/338.
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Revert commit b22cc03c7516b2003880db8375d26c76d6dff093.
Instead of manually adjusting the user and mode after creating the
file, adjust effective permissions and let the kernel deal with it.
Related to https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/338.
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The current code has a risk of race-conditions, since we pass a path
containing "/" to Fchownat. We could fix this by opening a file descriptor,
however, this does not seem worth the effort. We also don't chown *.name files.
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Make sure that the directory belongs to the correct owner before users
can access it. For directories with SUID/SGID mode, there is a risk of
race-conditions when files are created before the correct owner is set.
They will then inherit the wrong user and/or group.
See https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/327 for more details.
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Similar to gocryptfs.iv files they are never modified.
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Reported by @slackner at https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/327 :
Possible race-conditions between file creation and Fchownat
* Assume a system contains a gocryptfs mount as root user
with -allow_other
* As a regular user create a new file with mode containing
the SUID flag and write access for other users
* Before gocryptfs executes the Fchownat call, try to open
the file again, write some exploit code to it, and try to run it.
For a short time, the file is owned by root and has the SUID flag, so
this is pretty dangerous.
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Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/259
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Test that we handle symlinks correctly.
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Use O_ACCMODE mask in openWriteOnlyFile for improved readability.
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Fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/328
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Do not use PlainSizeToCipherSize() since this adds the 18 bytes file header.
Partially fixes https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/311
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We currently allocate 18 bytes too much:
https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/311
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matrix_test.go is already too big.
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