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authorJakob Unterwurzacher2019-01-08 21:50:10 +0100
committerJakob Unterwurzacher2019-01-08 21:50:10 +0100
commitb22cc03c7516b2003880db8375d26c76d6dff093 (patch)
tree69e3932784ece5228aa046984d73713d0a803022 /tests/hkdf_sanity
parent4170ef00f32b3943a75f1c85c2b21dbe27ba30cd (diff)
fusefrontend: -allow_other: set file mode *after* chown in Create()
Reported by @slackner at https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/issues/327 : Possible race-conditions between file creation and Fchownat * Assume a system contains a gocryptfs mount as root user with -allow_other * As a regular user create a new file with mode containing the SUID flag and write access for other users * Before gocryptfs executes the Fchownat call, try to open the file again, write some exploit code to it, and try to run it. For a short time, the file is owned by root and has the SUID flag, so this is pretty dangerous.
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