diff options
author | Jakob Unterwurzacher | 2021-09-04 11:41:56 +0200 |
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committer | Jakob Unterwurzacher | 2021-09-07 18:14:05 +0200 |
commit | e2ec048a09889b2bf71e8bbfef9f0584ff7d69db (patch) | |
tree | 84bb1f8c709f8db3b2dd551c7c5343c0ffe44ed9 /internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go | |
parent | bf572aef88963732849b8e5ae679e63c6be4aa46 (diff) |
stupidgcm: introduce stupidAEADCommon and use for both chacha & gcm
Nice deduplication and brings the GCM decrypt speed up to par.
internal/speed$ benchstat old new
name old time/op new time/op delta
StupidGCM-4 4.71µs ± 0% 4.66µs ± 0% -0.99% (p=0.008 n=5+5)
StupidGCMDecrypt-4 5.77µs ± 1% 4.51µs ± 0% -21.80% (p=0.008 n=5+5)
name old speed new speed delta
StupidGCM-4 870MB/s ± 0% 879MB/s ± 0% +1.01% (p=0.008 n=5+5)
StupidGCMDecrypt-4 710MB/s ± 1% 908MB/s ± 0% +27.87% (p=0.008 n=5+5)
Diffstat (limited to 'internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go')
-rw-r--r-- | internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go | 111 |
1 files changed, 111 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go b/internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8668dc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/stupidgcm/xchacha.go @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. +// +// Copied from +// https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/32db794688a5a24a23a43f2a984cecd5b3d8da58/chacha20poly1305/xchacha20poly1305.go +// and adapted for stupidgcm by @rfjakob. + +package stupidgcm + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "errors" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" +) + +type stupidXchacha20poly1305 struct { + // array instead of byte slice like + // `struct xchacha20poly1305` in x/crypto/chacha20poly1305 + key [chacha20poly1305.KeySize]byte + wiped bool +} + +// NewXchacha20poly1305 returns a XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD that uses the given 256-bit key. +// +// XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a ChaCha20-Poly1305 variant that takes a longer nonce, +// suitable to be generated randomly without risk of collisions. It should be +// preferred when nonce uniqueness cannot be trivially ensured, or whenever +// nonces are randomly generated. +func NewXchacha20poly1305(key []byte) cipher.AEAD { + if len(key) != chacha20poly1305.KeySize { + panic("bad key length") + } + ret := new(stupidXchacha20poly1305) + copy(ret.key[:], key) + return ret +} + +func (*stupidXchacha20poly1305) NonceSize() int { + return chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX +} + +func (*stupidXchacha20poly1305) Overhead() int { + return tagLen +} + +func (x *stupidXchacha20poly1305) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + if x.wiped { + panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key") + } + if len(nonce) != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX { + panic("bad nonce length passed to Seal") + } + + // XChaCha20-Poly1305 technically supports a 64-bit counter, so there is no + // size limit. However, since we reuse the ChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation, + // the second half of the counter is not available. This is unlikely to be + // an issue because the cipher.AEAD API requires the entire message to be in + // memory, and the counter overflows at 256 GB. + if uint64(len(plaintext)) > (1<<38)-64 { + panic("plaintext too large") + } + + hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16]) + c := newChacha20poly1305(hKey) + defer c.Wipe() + + // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space. + cNonce := make([]byte, chacha20poly1305.NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + + return c.Seal(dst, cNonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) +} + +func (x *stupidXchacha20poly1305) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if x.wiped { + panic("BUG: tried to use wiped key") + } + if len(nonce) != chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX { + panic("bad nonce length passed to Open") + } + if len(ciphertext) < 16 { + return nil, errors.New("message too short") + } + if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > (1<<38)-48 { + panic("ciphertext too large") + } + + hKey, _ := chacha20.HChaCha20(x.key[:], nonce[0:16]) + c := newChacha20poly1305(hKey) + defer c.Wipe() + + // The first 4 bytes of the final nonce are unused counter space. + cNonce := make([]byte, chacha20poly1305.NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + + return c.Open(dst, cNonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData) +} + +// Wipe tries to wipe the key from memory by overwriting it with zeros. +// +// This is not bulletproof due to possible GC copies, but +// still raises the bar for extracting the key. +func (g *stupidXchacha20poly1305) Wipe() { + g.wiped = true + for i := range g.key { + g.key[i] = 0 + } +} |