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authorJakob Unterwurzacher2020-08-01 21:13:00 +0200
committerJakob Unterwurzacher2020-08-01 21:14:33 +0200
commitf54d21c38427e68b598546c1c870a289cb5e99bb (patch)
treeeeb3a55f70a3cb105a0da8e46ad6423f98da0401 /internal/fusefrontend_reverse/rpath.go
parent18b3bdb1584fd8e3dde89a95c0dfff910dd95ae1 (diff)
v2api/reverse: implement Lookup & Getattr
Diffstat (limited to 'internal/fusefrontend_reverse/rpath.go')
-rw-r--r--internal/fusefrontend_reverse/rpath.go102
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/internal/fusefrontend_reverse/rpath.go b/internal/fusefrontend_reverse/rpath.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed37847
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/fusefrontend_reverse/rpath.go
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package fusefrontend_reverse
+
+import (
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "path/filepath"
+ "strings"
+ "syscall"
+
+ "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/nametransform"
+ "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/pathiv"
+ "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/syscallcompat"
+ "github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/internal/tlog"
+)
+
+// abs basically returns storage dir + "/" + relPath.
+// It takes an error parameter so it can directly wrap decryptPath like this:
+// a, err := rfs.abs(rfs.decryptPath(relPath))
+// abs never generates an error on its own. In other words, abs(p, nil) never
+// fails.
+func (rfs *RootNode) abs(relPath string, err error) (string, error) {
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ return filepath.Join(rfs.args.Cipherdir, relPath), nil
+}
+
+// rDecryptName decrypts the ciphertext name "cName", given the dirIV of the
+// directory "cName" lies in. The relative plaintext path to the directory
+// "pDir" is used if a "gocryptfs.longname.XYZ.name" must be resolved.
+func (rfs *RootNode) rDecryptName(cName string, dirIV []byte, pDir string) (pName string, err error) {
+ nameType := nametransform.NameType(cName)
+ if nameType == nametransform.LongNameNone {
+ pName, err = rfs.nameTransform.DecryptName(cName, dirIV)
+ if err != nil {
+ // We get lots of decrypt requests for names like ".Trash" that
+ // are invalid base64. Convert them to ENOENT so the correct
+ // error gets returned to the user.
+ if _, ok := err.(base64.CorruptInputError); ok {
+ return "", syscall.ENOENT
+ }
+ // Stat attempts on the link target of encrypted symlinks.
+ // These are always valid base64 but the length is not a
+ // multiple of 16.
+ if err == syscall.EBADMSG {
+ return "", syscall.ENOENT
+ }
+ return "", err
+ }
+ } else if nameType == nametransform.LongNameContent {
+ panic("todo")
+ //pName, err = rfs.findLongnameParent(pDir, dirIV, cName)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ } else {
+ // It makes no sense to decrypt a ".name" file. This is a virtual file
+ // that has no representation in the plaintext filesystem. ".name"
+ // files should have already been handled in virtualfile.go.
+ tlog.Warn.Printf("rDecryptName: cannot decrypt virtual file %q", cName)
+ return "", syscall.EINVAL
+ }
+ return pName, nil
+}
+
+// decryptPath decrypts a relative ciphertext path to a relative plaintext
+// path.
+func (rn *RootNode) decryptPath(relPath string) (string, error) {
+ if rn.args.PlaintextNames || relPath == "" {
+ return relPath, nil
+ }
+ parts := strings.Split(relPath, "/")
+ var transformedParts []string
+ for i := range parts {
+ // Start at the top and recurse
+ currentCipherDir := filepath.Join(parts[:i]...)
+ currentPlainDir := filepath.Join(transformedParts[:i]...)
+ dirIV := pathiv.Derive(currentCipherDir, pathiv.PurposeDirIV)
+ transformedPart, err := rn.rDecryptName(parts[i], dirIV, currentPlainDir)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", err
+ }
+ transformedParts = append(transformedParts, transformedPart)
+ }
+ pRelPath := filepath.Join(transformedParts...)
+ return pRelPath, nil
+}
+
+// openBackingDir receives an already decrypted relative path
+// "pRelPath", opens the directory that contains the target file/dir
+// and returns the fd to the directory and the decrypted name of the
+// target file. The fd/name pair is intended for use with fchownat and
+// friends.
+func (rn *RootNode) openBackingDir(pRelPath string) (dirfd int, pName string, err error) {
+ // Open directory, safe against symlink races
+ pDir := filepath.Dir(pRelPath)
+ dirfd, err = syscallcompat.OpenDirNofollow(rn.args.Cipherdir, pDir)
+ if err != nil {
+ return -1, "", err
+ }
+ pName = filepath.Base(pRelPath)
+ return dirfd, pName, nil
+}