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authorJakob Unterwurzacher2021-06-26 18:45:21 +0200
committerJakob Unterwurzacher2021-06-26 18:49:54 +0200
commit4fd95b718b9f7b022c1960711fc7dfe7b5350c15 (patch)
tree50effbbf2523fc77b1cb1eb120c4b9af49348921 /internal/fusefrontend
parent5306fc345be41371820ea50a3f64efab08f2e74c (diff)
fusefrontend: delete openBackingDir
Diffstat (limited to 'internal/fusefrontend')
-rw-r--r--internal/fusefrontend/root_node.go65
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/internal/fusefrontend/root_node.go b/internal/fusefrontend/root_node.go
index ab0cdcd..c82078d 100644
--- a/internal/fusefrontend/root_node.go
+++ b/internal/fusefrontend/root_node.go
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package fusefrontend
import (
"os"
- "path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"syscall"
@@ -210,70 +209,6 @@ func (rn *RootNode) openWriteOnlyFile(dirfd int, cName string, newFlags int) (rw
return syscallcompat.Openat(dirfd, cName, newFlags, 0)
}
-// openBackingDir opens the parent ciphertext directory of plaintext path
-// "relPath". It returns the dirfd (opened with O_PATH) and the encrypted
-// basename.
-//
-// The caller should then use Openat(dirfd, cName, ...) and friends.
-// For convenience, if relPath is "", cName is going to be ".".
-//
-// openBackingDir is secure against symlink races by using Openat and
-// ReadDirIVAt.
-//
-// Retries on EINTR.
-func (rn *RootNode) openBackingDir(relPath string) (dirfd int, cName string, err error) {
- dirRelPath := nametransform.Dir(relPath)
- // With PlaintextNames, we don't need to read DirIVs. Easy.
- if rn.args.PlaintextNames {
- dirfd, err = syscallcompat.OpenDirNofollow(rn.args.Cipherdir, dirRelPath)
- if err != nil {
- return -1, "", err
- }
- // If relPath is empty, cName is ".".
- cName = filepath.Base(relPath)
- return dirfd, cName, nil
- }
- // Open cipherdir (following symlinks)
- dirfd, err = syscallcompat.Open(rn.args.Cipherdir, syscall.O_DIRECTORY|syscallcompat.O_PATH, 0)
- if err != nil {
- return -1, "", err
- }
- // If relPath is empty, cName is ".".
- if relPath == "" {
- return dirfd, ".", nil
- }
- // Walk the directory tree
- parts := strings.Split(relPath, "/")
- for i, name := range parts {
- iv, err := nametransform.ReadDirIVAt(dirfd)
- if err != nil {
- syscall.Close(dirfd)
- return -1, "", err
- }
- if rn.nameTransform.HaveBadnamePatterns() {
- cName, err = rn.nameTransform.EncryptAndHashBadName(name, iv, dirfd)
- } else {
- cName, err = rn.nameTransform.EncryptAndHashName(name, iv)
- }
- if err != nil {
- syscall.Close(dirfd)
- return -1, "", err
- }
- // Last part? We are done.
- if i == len(parts)-1 {
- break
- }
- // Not the last part? Descend into next directory.
- dirfd2, err := syscallcompat.Openat(dirfd, cName, syscall.O_NOFOLLOW|syscall.O_DIRECTORY|syscallcompat.O_PATH, 0)
- syscall.Close(dirfd)
- if err != nil {
- return -1, "", err
- }
- dirfd = dirfd2
- }
- return dirfd, cName, nil
-}
-
// encryptSymlinkTarget: "data" is encrypted like file contents (GCM)
// and base64-encoded.
// The empty string encrypts to the empty string.